

## Message Text

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INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 4010

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJ: MBFR: DEFINITION OF FORCES

REFS: A) USNATO 3918 DTG 251213Z JUL 75; B) USNATO 4009

1. THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF A REVISED WG DRAFT STUDY ON FORCE REDEFINITIONS ARISING FROM THE JULY 29 WG CONSIDERATION OF AN EARLIER VERSION (REF A).

2. HE NETHERLANDS REP (VAN HEENSTRA) SAID HIS AUTHORITIES WERE VERY PLEASED WITH THE INITIAL WG DRAFT WITH TWO EXCEPTIONS. THE HAGUE BELIEVES THERE MUST BE FURTHER ELABORATION ON THE PROBLEMS POSED BY THE FORCE REDEFINITION FOR VERIFICATION AND NON-COMPLIANCE (PARAS 4.C. AND 19.0

OF REF A). HE FURTHER NOTED THAT PARA 4.D. POINTS UP THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EFFECTS OF THIS ISSUE ON ALLIED SECURITY, BUT DOES NOT GO SECRET

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INTO ANY DETAIL ON THESE EFFECTS. IT WAS AGREED TO EXPAND ON BOTH POINTS.

3. THE UK MOD REP (GERAHTY) QUESTIONED THE USE OF "END 1974"

FIGURES IN THE REPORT; THESE HAVE NOT YET BEEN AGREED BY NATO.  
IT WAS AGREED TO DELETE THESE FIGURES,  
EXPLAINING THE REASON FOR THE DELETION IN A FOOTNOTE.

4. TH UK MOD REP ALSO BELIEVED THE WG SHOULD STRENGTHEN THE POINT MADE IN PARAS 3 AND 18 OF REF A THAT THERE MIGHT BE AN ADDITIONAL SLICE OF GROUND LOGISTICS SUPPORT PERSONNEL WHOM THE EAST WILL ATTEMPT TO REDEFINE AS AIR FORCE PERSONNEL AT SOME FUTURE TIME. HE SAID UK STUDIES SHOWED THAT UP TO 30,000 OF THESE LOGISTIC PERSONNEL COULD BE INVOLVED IN SUPPORTING THE AIR FORCE. THE SHAPE REP (GRIFFIN) POINTED OUT THAT WHILE THE FORCE REDEFINITION STUDY BY THE WG ASSIGNS CERTAIN NUMBERS TO THE THREE REDEFINED CATEGORIES, I.E., AREA AIR DEFENSE, HELICOPTERS AND SSM UNITS, THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT THE EAST WILL RESTRICT ITSELF TO THESE SAME NUMBERS IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. HE THUS CAUTIONED AGAINST ACCEPTING ANY REDEFINITION OF THESE THREE CATEGORIES 'IN PRINCIPLE' BEFORE KNOWING WHAT NUMERICAL VALUES THE EAST PLANS TO ASSIGN TO EACH CATEGORY.

5. THE BELGIAN RE (BURNY) SUGGESTED THAT THIS POTENTIAL PITFALL COULD BE TREATED BY TURNING THE EASTERN PROPOSAL SLIGHTLY AND SAYING THAT THE COLOR OF THE UNIFORM WOULD BE THE DECIDING CRITERIA WITH CERTAIN SPECIFIC, QUANTIFIED EXCEPTIONS MADE ON THE BASIS OF FUNCTION (THE THREE CATEGORIES PRESENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION BEING THE ONLY EXCEPTIONS THUS FAR).

6. THE CANADINA REP (BECKETT) THOUGHT THE INCEREASE IN THE COMMON CEILING FROM 700,000 TO 717,000 BASED UPON A STRICT FOLLOWING OF THE RULE OF ONLY A MAXIMUM OF TEN PERCENT REDUCTIONS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DEFEND TO THE PUBLIC. THE AGRUMENT WOULD BE THAT "WE THOUGHT 700,000 WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO DEFEND THE WEST, HOWEVER, WE FOUND WE HAD MORE TROOPS THAN WE THOUGHT AND THEREFORE WE WILL NEED MORE IN THE COMMON CEILING"; HE FOUND THIS ARGUMENT TO BE WEAK. IT WAS AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT UNLESS THE BASIC MADATE ON A MAXIMUM OF TEN PERCENT REDUCTION IS CHANGED, THE WG WILL HAVE TO ABIDE BY  
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THIS FUGURE.

7. COMMENT: THE CANADIAN, FRG AND UK REPS EXPRESSED OPINIONS DURING SESSION THAT THIS PAPER IS CLOSELY RELATED TO THE WG STUDY ON SUB-CEILINGS WITHIN A COMBINED AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING (REF B). END COMMENT

8. ACTION REQUESTED: REQUEST GUIDANCE PRIOR TO AUGUST 12 WG SESSION.

9. BEGIN TEXT

MBFR: DEFINITION OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES

1. AT THEIR MEETING ON FRIDAY, 18 JULY, 1975, AFTER DISCUSSING A REPORT(1) BY THE AD HOC GROUP VIENNA ON THE COURSE OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE PERIOD MAY 16 TO JULY 17, 1975, INCLUDING THE PROGRESS OF DISCUSSIONS ON A POSSIBLE DEFINITION OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES, THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL INVITED THE MBFR WORKING GROUP TO EXAMINE THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE DEFINITION AND TO UPDATE A PREVIOUSREPORT(2) INVOLVING SIMOLAR POSSIBILITIES FOR DEFINITION OF FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IN MBFR.

#### BACKGROUND

2. THE WARSAW PACT HAVE PROPOSED, IN VIENNA, A DEFINITION OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES ON THE BASIS THAT ALL FORCES ON EACH SIDE WITH A SIMILAR FUNCTION BE PLACED IN THE SAME CATEGORY, EITHER GROUND OR AIR. THIS WOULD PROVIDE A DEFINITION OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES BASED ON AN ENUMERATION OF FUNCTIONAL TYPES OF FORCES. SPECIFICALLY, THE WARSAW PACT HAVE SUGGESTED THAT:

A. ALL TERRITORIAL (I.E. AREA) AIR DEFENCE PERSONNLE WOULD BE ASSIGNED TO AIR FORCES.

B. ALL HELICOPTER PERSONNEL WOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE GROUND FORCES, WITH POSSIBLY SOME MINOR SECEPTIONS. ALTERNATIVELY THEY SUGGESTED THAT ALL HELICPOTER PERSONNEL COULD BE COUNTED AS AIR FORCES, BUT THEY DID NOT PURSUE THIS ISSUE.

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FOOTNOTES: (1) AGV(75)025

(2) AC/275-D(74)8

C. ALL TACTIACAL SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE PERSONNEL WOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE GROUND FORCES.

3. IT IS FURTHER NOTED THAT THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS WOULD ENTAIL INCLUSION IN AIR FORCES OF, INTER ALIA "FORCES OF COMBAT LOGISTICS AND SERVICES OF THE AIR FORCES AND PVO". THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATIONIN VIENNA THAT THIS DEFINITION MIGHT BE TAKEN, DEPENDING ON INTERPRETATION, TO NECIESSITATE THE TRANSFER OF WP LOGISTIC AND SERVICES PERSONNEL CURRENTLY COUNTED BYNATO AS ARMY PERSONNEL, TO AIR FORCES. NEVERTHELESS, THIS APPROACH MIGHT LATER BE EXPLOITED: AND IS THEREFORE DISCUSSED BELOW.

4. THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS TO BE CONSIDERED ARE:

A. THE CHANGES IN THE NUMBERS OF REDUCTIONS OF GROUND FORCES BY BOTH SIDES.

B. THE IMPACT OF THE CHANGES ON THE COMMON CEILING  
CONCEPT BEARING IN MIND THAT THE WP MAY REFUSE TO AGREE THE  
ESTIMATES OF WP MANPOWER ATTRIBUTED TO THEM BY NATO AND  
INSIST IN THE USE IN NEGOTIATIONS OF LOWER WP MANPOWER FIGURES.

C. ANY FACTORS, DERIVING FROM IMPLEMENTATION OF THE  
CHANGES, BEARING ON ALLIED CONCEPTS OF VERIFICATION AND  
NON-CIRCUMVENTION.

D. FINALLY, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE EFFECTS ON ALLIED  
SECURITY.

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UNDER THE PACT DEFINITION A CASE COULD BE MADE FOR INCLUSION  
IN THE AIR FORCES FOR BOTH NATO AND PACT, OF ALL AREA AIR REFERENCE  
PERSONNEL, NOT NORMALLY REGARDED AS BEING UNDER THE DIRECT  
CONTROL OF COMMANDERS OF GROUND FORCE FORMATIONS. IN THAT  
CASE 13,000 SOVIET PERSONNEL OPERATING OR SUPPORTING SA 2/3  
WEAPON SYSTEMS AND 14,000 NATO PERSONNEL MANNING WEAPON SYSTEMS  
REGARDED AS EQUIVALENT AREA DEFENCE SYSTEMS ON THE NATO SIDE WOULD  
BE COUNTED AS AIR FORCES. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS HAVE  
INDICATED IN VIENNA THAT THIS IS NOT THEIR INTENTION AND  
THESE PERSONNEL ARE THEREFORE NOT FURTHER  
ADDRESSED IN THIS PAPER.

REVIEW

5. THE WP DEFINITION AT PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, ELABORATED  
IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION IN VIENNA, WOULD INVOLVE:

A. EXCLUSION FROM WP GROUND FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IN  
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MBFR OF PERSONNEL (42,000) SERVING IN CSSR AND POLISH NATIONAL  
AREA AIR DEFENCE ORGANISATIONS.

B. INCLUSION IN WP GROUND FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IN  
MBFR OF PERSONNEL SERVING IN HELICOPTER UNITS (18,000).

C. INCLUSION IN NATO GROUND FORCES (TO BE ADDRESSED IN  
MBFR) OF:

(1) CERTAIN PERSONNEL (2,000) OF BE, FRG, NL AND UK  
AIR FORCES, SERVING IN HELICOPTER UNITS.

2) FRG PERSONNEL OF THE AIR FORCE MANNING SSM  
(PERSHING) (3,700 ROUNDED TO 4,000).

6. THESE POSSIBLE CHANGES, EXCEPT 5C.1() ABOVE WERE  
DISCUSSED BY THE MBFR WORKING GROUP IN MID-1974, ON THE BASIS  
OF THE DATA THEN ACCEPTED BY NATO, UNDER CASES 1 AND 4 EXAMINED  
IN THE WORKING GROUP REPORT OF 17 SEPTEMBER, 1974. THIS NOTE  
DRAWS ON THAT WORKING GROUP REPORT.

EFFECTS FOR AIR FORCES

7. THE NUMERICAL EFFECT OF THE CHANGES PROPOSED (PARA 5  
ABOVE) BY THE WARSAW PACT FOR AIR FORCES WOULD BE (1):

MID 1974 ASSESSMENTS		
	AC/276-D(75)2 WP	END-1974 FIGURES NATO
A. STRENGTH	208,000	193,000
B. ASSIGN AREA AIR DEF PERSONNEL TO AIR PLUS	42,000(2)	
C. ASSIGN HELICOPTER PERSONNEL TO GRD	MINUS 18,000(2)	MINUS 2,000
D. ASSIGN SSM PERSONNEL TO GRD		MINUS 4,000
E. RESIDUAL PERSONNEL	232,000	187,000

FOOTNOTES:

(1) IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS THE ASSESSED STRENGTH OF PACT  
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GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER IS GIVEN FOR MID-74. ALTHOUGH

THERE IS AVAILABLE IN NATO AN AGREED ASSESSMENT OF PACT GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER TOTALS AS OF END-1974, THE BREAKDOWN OF THOSE TOTALS IS NOT HET NATO AGREED. THEREFORE TNE END-1974 TOTALS ON PACT FORCES ARE NOT USED IN THIS PAPER. FOR NATO THE LATEST END-1974 NIGURES ARE USED.

(2) THE NUMBERS ARE BASED ON PRESENT NATO ASSESSMENTS. THE NUMBERS COULD CHANGE IF THE PACT WERE TO EXPLOIT THE POINT MADE IN PARA 3 ABOVE. THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE AIR FORCE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS OF THE TWO SIDES, ON ALLIED ASSESSMENTS, WOULD THUS BE 45,000. IF, HOWEVER, ALL PACT AND NATO HELICOPTER PERSONNEL WERE TO BE ASSIGNED TO AIR, NATO WOULD HAVE 19,000 MORE AIR (EXCLUDING SOME FRENCH BECAUSE THEIR NUMBER IS NOT KNOWN), AND THE PACT 18,000 MORE. THUS NATO WOULD HAVE 206,000 AIR AND THE PACT 250,000 AIR. THE DISPARITY WOULD THEN BE 44,000.

8. ONE ALLIED ARGUMENT FOR NOT ADDRESSING AIR FORCES IN MBFR FOR REDUCTIONS - THAT THEY ARE BROADLY EQUAL IN NUMBERS - WOULD BE ERODED.

#### EFFECTS FOR GROUND FORCES

9. FOR GROUND FORCES MANPOWER, THE NUMERICAL EFFECT OF THE CHANGES PROPOSED BY THE WARSAW PACT WOULD BE(1):

#### GROUND FORCES NMANPOWER

END 74    END 74 MID 74

NATO    WP    NATO    WP

A. ASSESSED STRENGTH 777,000 925,000 791,000 937,000

B. ALLOCATE CZ/POL

AREA AIR DEF ERS

TO AIR    MINUS42,000(2)    MINUS42,000(2)

C. ALLOCATE HELI-

COPTER PERS TO    PLUS2,000    PLUS18,000(2)    PLUS2,000    PLUS18,000

(2)

GROUND FORCES

D. ALLOCATE TAC SSM

TO GRD FORCES    PLUS4,000    PLUS4,000

E. RESIDUAL ASSESSED

STRENGTH OF GRD 783,000 901,000 797,000 913,000

FORCES

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F. ASSESSED DISPARITY

PRE-ADJUSTMENT (AT 148,000    146,000

B-D)

G. DISPARITY POST-

ADJUSTMENT 118,000    116,000

IF ALL PACT AND NATO HELICOPTER PERSONNEL WERE TO BE ASSIGNED TO AIR, NATO WOULD HAVE 19,000 LESS GROUND (EXCLUSIVE SOME FRENCH BEVAUSE THEIR NUMBER IS NOT KNOWN) AND THE PACT

18,000. THUS NAT WOULD HAVE 778,000 GROUND AND THE PACT  
895,000 GROUND PERSONNEL. THE DISPARITY WOULD THEN BE 117,000.

FOOTNOTES:

(1) SEE FOOTNOTE (1) ON PAGE 3  
(2) THE NUMBERS ARE BASED ON PRESENT NATO ASSESSMENTS. THE NUMBERS  
COULD CHANGE IF THE PACT WERE TO EXPLOIT THE POINT MADE IN  
PARA 3 ABOVE.

10. THE NET EFFECT WOULD BE TO INCREASE THE ALLIED GROUND  
MANPOWER COUNT BY 6,000 AND TO REDUCE THE WP GROUND MANPOWER  
COUNT BY 24,000; THEREBY REDUCING THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE  
TWO SIDES BY 30,000. IT WILL BE NOTED (PARA 8 ABOVE) THAT THE  
DISPARITIES REDUCE THUS:

DATE OF ALLIED ESTIMATE	DISPARITIES REDUCE	
-----	FROM	TO
A. NOVEMBER 1973	148,000	118,000
B. END-1974 NATO: MID-1974 PACT	146,000	116,000

11. IF, AS PRESCRIBED IN C-M(73)83(FINAL), ALLIED  
REDUCTIONS IN GROUND FORCES DO NOT EXCEED 10 PCT. THE INCREASE  
IN ALLIED REDUCTIONS CONSEQUENT ON THIS REDEFINITION WOULD NOT  
BE SUBSTANTIAL: APPROXIMATELY 600. UNDER THAT APPROACH, THE  
ALLIED REQUIREMENT FOR A COMMON CEILING COULD NOT BE SET BELOW  
717,000 FOR GROUND MANPOWER, (I.E. BASED ON A MAXIMUM 10  
PERCENT REDUCTION FROM END-74 ALLIED GROUND MANPOWER STRENGTH  
OF 797,000).

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12. FOR THE WARSAW PACT, THE NUMBER OF GROUND FORCE  
REDUCTIONS REQUIRED WOULD REDUCE ON TWO COUNTS:

A. BY 24,000, ASSIGNED TO AIR FORCES.

B. BY A FURTHER 17,000, CONSEQUENT ON RAISING OF THE  
COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE FROM 700,000.  
THE REDUCTIONS REQUIRED OF THE WARSAW PACT WOULD BE:  
C. (913,000 - 717,000) EQUAL 196,000

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13. A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND MANPOWER WOULD HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED, AT A LEVEL OF REDUCTIONS (10 PCT.) TOLERABLE TO THE ALLIES IN CONSIDERATION OF THE RECIPROCAL REDUCTIONS. THE WARSAW PACT WOULD REDUCE GROUND MANPOWER ON A RATIO OF APPROXIMATELY 2.5:1. THE EFFECT, PRIMA FACIE, WOULD BE SATISFACTORY FOR THE ALLIANCE. THESE ESTIMATES, HOWEVER, ARE CRITICALLY DEPENDENT ON THE ACCURACY OF ALLIED ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT MANPOWER WHICH, THE WORKING GROUP HAS JUDGED, COULD BE SUBJECT TO A MARGIN OF ERROR AS HIGH AS 10 PCT. THE EFFECTS OF MARGINS OF ERROR AT 10 PCT. AND 5 PCT. ARE ILLUSTRATED BELOW, FOR WP REDUCTIONS.

MARGIN OF ERROR	MID 74 FIGURES
10 PCT 913,000-(10 PCT) 91,000 -822,000	COMMON CEILING 105,000
	AT 717,000
5 PCT 913,000-(5PCT) 45,500-867,500	COMMON CEILING 150,500
	AT 717,000

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14. ASSUMING ALLIED OBJECTIVES FOR PHASE I WERE IMPLEMENTED (INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL OF 29,000 US SOLDIERS AND 68,000 USSR SOLDIERS), REDUCTIONS REQUIRED TO REACH A COMMON CEILING IN PHASE 2 AT 717,000 WOULD BE, USING THE MID-74 ALLIED ESTIMATE OF PACT STRENGTH:

MARGIN OF ERROR IN ALLIED ESTIMATE	FOR THE WP	FOR THE ALLIES
A. AT 5 PCT	82,500	51,000
B. AT 10 PCT	37,000	51,000

IMPLICATIONS OF REDEFINITION FOR A COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING



15. A COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING, ADOPTED ON THE BASIS OF THE PROPOSED DEFINITION OF FORCES, COULD BE CALCULATED BY ADDING 187,000 (AIR FORCE MANPOWER) TO 717,000 (MINIMUM ALLIED GROUND MANPOWER AT 10 PCT REDUCTION), I.E. 904,000, I.E. ABOUT 900,000. FOR THE PACT THIS WOULD MEAN, WITH NO REDUCTIONS IN AIR, A GROUND TOTAL OF 668,000.

16. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT AIR FORCES WILL NOT BE ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS, THE NUMBERS OF GROUND PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS BY THE WP TO REACH A COMBINED COMMON CEILING ACCEPTABLE TO NATO WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY REDEFINITION. IN FACT, THE PACT WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE BY 145,000. HOWEVER, THOSE WP REDUCTIONS WOULD BE TAKEN FROM GROUND FORCES REDUCED BY REDEFINITION, THAT IS 913,000 (SEE PARA 9). TO ACHIEVE A COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING, BECAUSE THE WP AIR MANPOWER AS REDEFINED (232,000) IS HIGHER THAN NATO'S (187,000), THE WP RESIDUAL GROUND FORCES (668,000) WOULD HAVE TO FALL BELOW THE RESIDUAL NATO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER (717,000), BROADLY TO THE EXTENT OF THE DISPARITY (45,000) BETWEEN ALLIED AND PACT AIR FORCE MANPOWER COUNTS.

#### OTHER EFFECTS OF THE DEFINITION

17. THE CSSR AND POLISH AREA AIR DEFENCE TROOPS, WHO WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE AIR FORCE COUNT UNDER THE WP DEFINITION CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO THE SECURITY OF SOVIET AND OTHER PACT FORCES MOVING FORWARD FROM THE REAR TO THE WEST IN TIMES OF WAR.  
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THEY ALSO WOULD PROTECT AIRFIELDS AND OTHER MILITARY OBJECTS WHICH NATO IN TIMES OF WAR MIGHT WANT TO ATTACK FROM THE AIR. HOWEVER, THEY DO NOT CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO THE GROUND FORCE CONFRONTATION AND, IN PARTICULAR, DO NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE MOBILE, ARMoured (TANK) THREAT WHICH THE ALLIES MOST WISH TO REDUCE. THE TRANSFER OF THESE ELEMENTS TO THE AIR FORCE COUNT WOULD NOT ERODE THE ALLIED CONCEPT OF REDUCING THAT CONFRONTATION. CONVERSELY, THE HELICOPTERS AND THEIR OPERATING AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL WHO WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE WP GROUND FORCES COUNT DO, IN PART, CONTRIBUTE TO THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF WP GROUND COMBAT FORMATIONS: IF THE WP DEFINITION WERE ACCEPTED, THESE HELICOPTER PERSONNEL WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE GROUND FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IN MBFR. AT PRESENT THE ALLIES COUNT THEM AS AIR FORCE PERSONNEL. IN THESE RESPECTS, THE CHANGES IN DEFINITION PROPOSED BY THE WARSAW PACT SHOULD HAVE NO ADVERSE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS, IN THEMSELVES, FOR NATO.

18. THE POINT IS MADE (PARA 3 ABOVE) THAT THE WP DEFINITION COULD BE INTERPRETED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE WP, AND THE USSR IN PARTICULAR, COULD CLAIM THAT A SLICE OF THE INTEGRATED REAR FORCES OF COMBAT LOGISTICS AND SERVICES COULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE AIR FORCES. THAT SLICE OF COURSE DOES NOT INCLUDE THE COMBAT LOGISTIC AND SERVICE PERSONNEL OF THE PACT AIR FORCES ALREADY COUNTED BY NATO AS AIR (23 PCT. OF THE TOTAL PACT

AIR STRENGTH). IT WOULD INVOLVE OTHER PACT PERSONNEL, PRESENTLY COUNTED BY NATO AS GROUND SUPPORTING BOTH THE PACT ARMY AND AIR FORCE. IF THE PACT WERE TO EXPLOIT THEIR DEFINITION TO COUNT SOME OF THESE PERSONNEL AS AIR, THE NUMBER INVOLVED, AS A PRELIMINARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF ONE NATION INDICATES, COULD BE AS HIGH AS 30,000. IN VIEW OF THE LOW MANPOWER TO AIRCRAFT RATIO IN THE PACT AND ESPECIALLY THE SOVIET AIR FORCE, THE MBFR WORKING GROUP THINK THAT SUCH A NUMBER IS WELL POSSIBLE. MOREOVER, NATO COULD NOT CHALLENGE ANY FIGURE THE PACT WOULD TABLE, BECAUSE THERE IS NO FIRM INTELLIGENCE IN DETAIL AVAILABLE. IT IS TRUE THAT ALSO ON THE NATO SIDE SOME GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL COULD BE RECATEGORISED AS AIR, BECAUSE THEY PROVIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO THE NATO AIR FORCES. HOWEVER, THAT NUMBER COMPARED WITH THE PACT WOULD BE SMALL.

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19. THERE IS, AS SAID IN PARA 3 NO INDICATION THAT THE WP INTEND TO EXPLOIT THIS LOOPHOLE. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP NEVERTHELESS BELIEVES THAT IT COULD BE EXPLOITED AND THAT THIS PROBABLY WOULD ONLY BECOME CLEAR WHEN THE WARSAW PACT TABLES ITS AIR MANPOWER FIGURES ON FORCES OF COMBAT LOGISTIC AND SERVICES FOR THE AIR FORCE, INCLUDING PVOS. THEREFORE, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO EXCLUDE THIS POSSIBILITY, WHICH IF USED WOULD FURTHER REDUCE THE MANPOWER DESPARITY BETWEEN ALLIED AND PACT GROUND MANPOWER: AND SIMILARLY FURTHER REDUCE THE NUMBER OF GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS REQUIRED BY THE PACT UNDER A

COLLECTIVE GROUND COMMON CEILING.

20. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP BELIEVES THAT A DEFINITION, BASED ON THE UNIFORM PRINCIPLE, REMAINS FOR NATO THE MOST PRACTICAL WAY OF DEFINING FORCES. IT IS COMPREHENSIVE, THE EASIEST TO VERIFY AND PLAYS DOWN THE EQUIPMENT ISSUE. 90 PCT. OF THE FORCES OF BOTH SIDES CAN BE CATEGORIZED IN AN UNDISPUTABLE WAY UNDER THAT DEFINITION. THE REMAINING 10 PCT. COULD BE ACCEPTED AS AN  
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EXCEPTION AND CATEGORISED UNDER A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. BEFORE ACCEPTING SUCH A RECATEGORISATION NATO WOULD NEED, HOWEVER, TO BE ASSURED BY THE PACT THAT THE ONLY THREE CATEGORIES INVOLVED ARE THE THREE ADDRESSED IN THIS PAPER, AND THAT IN NUMERICAL TERMS THE EFFECTS ARE APPROXIMATELY THE SAME AS CALCULATED BY NATO. ACCEPTANCE OF A DEFINITION, BASED ON AN ENUMERATION OF FUNCTIONAL TYPES OF FORCES, WOULD LEAD TO ACCEPTANCE OF AN OUTCOME WHICH IS UNPREDICTABLE (SEE PARA 18) AND THEREFORE DANGEROUS.

#### SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

20. IT FOLLOWS FROM THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPHS THAT IF THE DEFINITION FOR CATEGORISATION OF FORCES OF BOTH SIDES REMAINS TO BE BASED ON THE UNIFORM PRINCIPLE, ALLOWING FOR EXCEPTIONS OF THE THREE ANOMALIES DISCUSSED IN THE PAPER, PROVIDED IN NUMERICAL TERMS THE EFFECTS ARE AS PREDICTED, THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO ARE TOLERABLE. HOWEVER, THE ARGUMENT THAT AIR FORCE PERSONNEL SHOULD NOT BE REDUCED, BECAUSE THE NUMBERS ON BOTH SIDES ARE EQUAL, IS ERODED AND THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES WILL BE REDUCED BY 30,000.

#### VERIFICATION

21. THE VERIFICATION EFFECTS OF A REDEFINITION OF FORCES ON THE BASIS UNDER DISCUSSION WERE EXAMINED BY THE WORKING GROUP IN MID-1974(1). THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS COULD BE THAT THE INSPECTION SYSTEM WOULD:

A. ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTIES IN VERIFYING DIRECTLY THE LEVEL OF STRENGTHS IN THE CSSR AND POLISH NATIONAL AIR DEFENCE ORGANISATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF THESE LEVELS.

FOOTNOTE: (1) AC/276-D(74)8

B. BE REQUIRED TO EXTEND INSPECTION TO SOVIET HELICOPTER PERSONNEL.

THE NECESSARY TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS TO MEET THE CHANGES MENTIONED ABOVE COULD BE MADE, WHEN THE PRECISE REQUIREMENT IS KNOWN AND THE FORM OF AN ACCEPTABLE OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM  
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IS AGREED.

NON-CIRCUMVENTION

21. THE RECATEGORISATION OF CZECH AND POLISH AREA AIR DEFENCE PERSONNEL FROM GROUND TO AIR WOULD, AS COMPARED WITH THE EXISTING NATO CONCEPT(2) PROVIDE NO ADDITIONAL OPENING FOR CIRCUMVENTION PROVIDED THAT THOSE FORCES WOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN SOME FORCE LIMITATION OR OTHER FORMULATION. THE RECATEGORISATION OF SOVIET HELICOPTER PERSONNEL FROM AIR TO GROUND WOULD PROVIDE NO OPENING FOR CIRCUMVENTION OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT.

FOOTNOTE: (2) C-M(73)83(FINAL)  
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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 18 AUG 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 30 JUL 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** izenbei0  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975NATO04010  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** NATO  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
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**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t197507102/abbrzlgu.tel  
**Line Count:** 614  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** n/a  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 12  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** A) USNATO 3918 DTG 251213Z JUL 75; B) USNATO 4009  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** izenbei0  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 04 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <04 APR 2003 by Izenbei0>; APPROVED <24 SEP 2003 by izenbei0>  
**Review Markings:**

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US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR: DEFINITION OF FORCES  
**TAGS:** PARM, NATO, MBFR  
**To:** STATE  
SECDEF INFO MBFR VIENNA  
BONN  
LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006